Misc - HL 174 (10)

Many posts concerning TWA 800 and Asiana 214

TWA 800 Documentary – Epix video airing July 17^th.  ]

Pilot opinions and posts about the accident and about the documentary:

For those who will not be able to find this video, that details the 747 was not the victim of fuel pump malfunction, you can view it in rough cut at this location online: 

Subject: Epix Documentary Video

 Good Morning everyone. Here is a link to the "rough cut" of the TWA 800 documentary which will be aired on the Epix channel on July 17th, the 17th anniversary of the downing of our aircraft. The video is lengthy, 1:46, but is a well done damming of the CIA, FBI and NTSB.

 Go to this link - https://vimeo.com/59099154 - and enter the password epix123.

 Fraternally,     Chuck

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From: "Roger L. Edson" <rle915@hotmail.com>
Date: July 7, 2013, 12:33:24 AM EDT
To: Charles Hair

Subject: TWA Flt 800 - Shot down by Missile

I got this email from a former (now retired) TWA Captain, who alerted me to this situation being brought out into the open again and about the airing of the Epix video discussing the details, which is set to air on July 17th.  (If you have the capability to see it.  Search google about Epix video's and your own TV provider, to see if you can receive it.  I cannot because I use Directv and they are not affiliated with Epix.     Roger Edson

 

Good afternoon Rog,

 I guess there is no way to see that broadcast.  TWA 800 was definitely brought down by a missle without a warhead.  Johnston Laboratories fired it and the government covered it up because of the salt agreement prohibiting testing. 

 

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Asiana 214 – Multiple posts since the tragic crash:

(For a map layout of the SFO airport that will display runways and taxiways, click on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:SFO_map.png)

 

From: Dave Norvell

Date: 7/8/2013 3:26:56 PM

Subject: Update on SFO crash - Interesting email I received

  

Here's a passengers version of what happened during and after the crash.  Interesting to read……..

Below is an e-mail from the father of one of the passengers who was aboard the Asiana flight that crashed yesterday at San Francisco (the father is a friend of a friend).  It's an unvarnished recount through the eyes of one of the lucky ones who emerged virtually unscathed.  His observations about the post-crash response do raise concerns about the level of coordination and preparedness at that major airport.

 

Begin forwarded message:

 

We finally got to talk directly with Brian this morning about noon.  He got home about 10:30 last night after a terrifying and frustrating day.  He is scraped up a little and banged up but had no injuries that required treatment.  The following account is as I can remember from what he told us. 

Brian and part of his group was in row 16 some more in row 18 and the remainder in row 20.  They had had a great week in South Korea and the flight had been uneventful.    As they neared the approach Brian felt like they were too high as the plane descended sharply and then he heard the engines spool up as if the pilot realized that he had descended too much.  Brian said the nose pitched up but the plane did not raise much.  He said that there was a very loud impact as the tail hit and then a much larger impact as the nose slammed down.  He then said the plane slewed to the left and rose up to about 45 degrees with the right wing high because he said he was looking down at the girl across the aisle from him.  The plane slammed down again and spun further down the runway and ended up in the dirt several hundred yards from the seawall that they had hit.  Brian and the people near him were trying to go forward to exit on the left but there was a problem with that door (it may be the door that they are now reporting that had the slide deploy inside the cabin) so they turned around so they could go out the back through the hole that was the back of the aircraft that had been sheared off.  They were apparently near the end of a long line and were beginning to see smoke and dust.  He looked back and saw that they were getting the front door open and the slide deployed so they turned around and went back and went out the slide in front of the wing.  He said he felt badly that he had run into two elderly ladies that were having trouble exiting the slide but he helped them up.  He and the part of the group that was with him ran around to the back of the plane where the rest of the group had jumped to the ground through the hole.  They moved away from the aircraft and were watching the fire crews begin to deploy and foam down the aircraft which was burning.  One of his friends (Elliot Stone) was looking back up the runway and saw a flight attendant several hundred yards away waving at them and trying to walk.  They tried  to get the attention of the firefighters and police (no paramedics on scene) to no avail.  Brian, Elliot and two others from their group ran back toward the attendant they could see.  Elliot stayed with that attendant and Brian went on down the runway.  He came upon a young woman who was obviously dying (unconscious but moving a little) and was going to stay with her but saw another woman who was a flight attendant nearby who was moving and bleeding.  He went to her and saw she was very seriously hurt with facial, head and spinal injuries.  He held her hand and talked with her and wanted to get a blanket for her but she begged him to stay with her which he did.  The other two also found injured flight attendants and tried to help them.  They were waiving and trying to get the attention of the police or fire personnel to divert some of the arriving EMS resources to them.  An airport staff person arrived in a truck and also tried to get help for them.  According to Elliot on CNN it was 20 to 30 minutes before they got any help.  It may not have been that long in real time but in their minds it was clearly way way after the triage had been set up back by the plane and others with lesser injuries were being treated and transported.  They finally did get the attention of two ambulances and they arrived and according to Brian were very leisurely in getting their gear out and arranged before even approaching the victims.  Brian said one of the EMS staff was so obese he had a hard time getting out of the ambulance.   The injured were put on backboards, neck braces etc. and loaded up.  A policeman had arrived and tried to order Brian and his crew back to the plane because this was a crime scene.  Brian and co. refused saying they would only after the injured women were transported.  The ambulances left and again the policeman ordered them back to the aircraft.  They were going to comply until Brian looked over and saw that they had left one of the women strapped to a backboard behind.   Someone  had put a cloth over her eyes to shield her from the sun but I guess the other crew assumed that she had expired and left her there.   She was not dead and was still moving.  Brian and his friends just completely lost it with the cop and refused to leave until another ambulance arrived to collect her.   Brian and Elliot and friends are EXTREMELY angry over the EMS response.   They then began walking back toward the airplane and Brian found   one of his shoes, a book and a shirt from his suitcase but couldn’t see his suitcase or other stuff from it including his medicine. 

The story goes on and on from there with directions and counter directions and counter counter directions over the next 8 hours.    After conflicting direction from the police, FAA, Homeland Security, FBI etc. Elliot had had enough and called CNN and began giving interviews which you may have heard on the air which are not at all flattering of the response to the crash.  The problem is that since Elliot’s phone battery was dead, he borrowed Brian’s phone so now Brian is getting all these calls for follow-up interviews and calls from other news and television agencies because CNN apparently shared the call back number which went to Brian’s phone.

They were finally released and got home about 10:30.  He was not able to sleep much (neither did we) and still sounds very angry today.  I am sure that some of that is a reaction the things he experienced and saw yesterday and some just may be exhaustion and shot nerves.   I told Brian he really needs to share what they went through (with the EMS response) with the NTSB and the San Francisco FD.  I don’t believe the LAFD would ever allow one of their personnel to be so obese that they could not effectively perform their duties.

We thank you all for your thoughts, prayers and expressions of concern. 

D & S

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From: Ray D

Date: 7/8/2013 5:00:09 PM

To: Undisclosed-Recipient:,

Subject: Asiana flight attendant Jiyeon Kim

A diminutive flight attendant carried injured passengers piggyback to safety while two passengers worked to free another flight attendant pinned by an inflated emergency slide.

Mr. Rah saw another flight attendant, whose name he gave as Jiyeon Kim, carrying injured passengers down the aisle to get them off the plane.

"She was a hero," he said. "This tiny, little girl was carrying people piggyback, running everywhere, with tears running down her face. She was crying, but she was still so calm and helping people."

U.S. NEWS

Updated July 7, 2013, 8:25 p.m. ET

Why the San Francisco Plane Crash Wasn't More Deadly

Quick-Thinking Heroics, Air-Safety Gains Kept Death Toll Low

By REBECCA SMITH, JON OSTROWER and ANDY PASZTOR

A diminutive flight attendant carried injured passengers piggyback to safety while two passengers worked to free another flight attendant pinned by an inflated emergency slide, all racing to escape Asiana Airlines Flight 214 minutes before it burst into flames.

Such quick-thinking heroics in the minutes after the plane's spectacular crash at San Francisco International Airport, combined with technological enhancements in recent years that have made jetliner accidents more survivable, likely prevented Saturday's disaster from being far more deadly, experts said.

Broken Landing

View Graphics

Getty Images

The crash left pieces of the Boeing 777 strewn about the airfield and triggered a fire that burned away much of the plane's roof. Of the 307 passengers and crew aboard the flight from Seoul, two died, both 16-year-old girls from among a Chinese group of students and teachers headed to the U.S. for precollege exchange programs. More than 180 others were taken to hospitals with injuries. Two local hospitals listed 30 people still admitted as of Sunday afternoon, eight of which were in critical condition and two paralyzed.

The crash occurred with little warning for passengers. Eugene Anthony Rah, a frequent flier on Asiana who was sitting in business class, said he noticed the plane was approaching too low over San Francisco Bay, then he heard an engine noise that made him think the pilot was trying to gain elevation.

"We hit hard and bounced up. People were screaming," he recalled. The plane seemed to careen out of control, skidding sideways, before stopping. Then there was "total silence," he said.

Emergency responders sprayed the Asiana plane after it crash-landed in San Francisco on Saturday.

Mr. Rah noticed that an evacuation slide had inflated inside the plane, pinning a flight attendant against the interior cabin wall. He and another passenger tried to free the attendant, looking for something sharp with which to puncture the slide. Another passenger eventually found a way to let the air out of the slide. Mr. Rah said he has been in touch with the flight attendant's husband, who said she sustained serious injuries but is improving.

The captain soon started screaming on the loudspeaker for everyone to evacuate. As other passengers began exiting the plane and emergency crews arrived, Mr. Rah saw another flight attendant, whose name he gave as Jiyeon Kim, carrying injured passengers down the aisle to get them off the plane.

"She was a hero," he said. "This tiny, little girl was carrying people piggyback, running everywhere, with tears running down her face. She was crying, but she was still so calm and helping people."

Meanwhile, San Francisco police officers at the scene had entered the plane from near the back and made their way to the front, amid worsening smoke, said Lyn Tomioka, deputy chief at the San Francisco Police Department. When they got to the front, male crew members trying to help passengers called out for knives, and the officers tossed their own knives to the men to help them cut seat belts off passengers who were struggling to get out, Ms. Tomioka said.

Aviation-safety experts said the human toll of the crash was almost certainly reduced by efforts of jet makers, airlines and regulators to reduce the deadliness of air accidents—from the use of flame-retardant materials and new seats designed to withstand tremendous force, to changes in areas such as crew training.

 

Flight attendant Jiyeon Kim, at far left, had helped passengers escape from the plane.

The Asiana crash "is the culmination of what has been done over more than 20 years to help more and more passengers survive crashes," according to Kevin Hiatt, president and chief executive of the Flight Safety Foundation, a nonprofit group in Alexandria, Va., that advocates for safety improvements world-wide.

Regulators in the late 1980s mandated all-new passenger planes must have seats able to withstand stronger impacts than in the past—practices that the Federal Aviation Administration ordered in 2005 be applied to nearly all passenger planes by October 2009. As part of those rules, seats on jetliners must be able in tests to survive collisions that slam them forward at 16 times the force of gravity, or 16g, to ensure the seats don't collapse or detach from the floor. A Boeing spokesman said the company has been delivering all its jets with 16g-rated seats since 2009.

Before the advent of such stronger seats, Mr. Hiatt said, the intense vertical and horizontal force generated by a crash like Saturday's "would have caused many more seats to break free and pancake into each other, probably blocking exit paths."

Mr. Hiatt also said improved fire-resistant materials used on seats and other parts of the cabin "likely helped the fire from intensifying so quickly."

Enhanced crew training also has made a significant difference. Cabin crews train to evacuate passengers in chaotic and unpredictable circumstances, including being unsure which exits are safe to use. Airplanes are designed to be evacuated in just 90 seconds, even when half the doors and escape slides are inoperative or unavailable.

Other factors helped limit the toll of Saturday's accident. Because the plane was landing, its speed was relatively slow, reducing the force with which it crashed. Rescue crews used cutting-edge nozzles, equipped with cameras, attached to the end of hoses. Firefighters were able to maneuver those nozzles directly inside the cabin and aim the spray at the most dangerous hot spots. In addition, some crews had equipment able to pierce the plane's aluminum fuselage to gain better access to the fire.

Other high-profile crashes in recent years have also seen many passengers escape alive. Everyone survived a 2008 Continental Airlines flight that veered off a Denver runway in high winds, splitting the body of the jet in two. Two passengers died in August 2010 when an Aires Boeing 737 landed short in bad weather at a Caribbean island, also splitting the passenger cabin into pieces. In April, a newly delivered Lion Air Boeing 737 crashed in poor visibility short of a runway in Bali, Indonesia; all 108 people aboard survived.

In San Francisco, "everyone was fortunate that the fire didn't start immediately, so it gave passengers time to scramble out of the plane," said Michael Barr, who teaches air-safety courses at the University of Southern California.

"I'm just grateful I survived," said Mr. Rah, the passenger. "I was 99.9% sure I was going to die. I was hoping for a 0.1% miracle, and I got it."

—Vauhini Vara, Daniel Michaels, Ben Kesling and William Harless contributed to this article.

Write to Rebecca Smith at rebecca.smith@wsj.com, Jon Ostrower at jon.ostrower@wsj.com and Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com

Copyright 2012 Dow Jones & Company, Inc.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324867904578592180482641220.html?mod=ITP_pageone_2

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From: Steve Rodmon

Date: 7/9/2013 7:11:09 AM

To: Mark Sztanyo

Subject: What Happened to Asiana Airlines Flight 214?

                                                                                                                                                   

- FROM A TWA LINE CHECK AIRMAN:

 This approach is what I would expect from an inexperienced copilot getting line training with an instructor.

Except, a TWA instructor would never have let the situation get so out of hand.

The real blame for this accident goes to the instructor pilot.

 Aircraft was high above the glide path, so roughly 1400 fps decent meant the power was way back, maybe even idle. 

A/c was not stabilized at 500 and should gone around; except that means losing face.

 Failed to recognize the imaginary 3 degree glide slope and flew low, then flatten out, incredibly without bring power back on to maintain 140 kts. It takes nearly full power to fly straight and level with gear/flaps out. 

 Both pilot flying and instructor allowed airspeed to decay to something like 30 knots below bug speed. Just unimaginable in a commercial airliner.

 One report says the pilot flying was a biggie in their system; so IP may have put diplomacy before safety.

 I image the IP called for more power as speed decayed but when it didn't happened (adequate throttle advance) he should have physically taken control. Too low and too slow to be giving verbal instruction. Needed to grab yoke and throttles. Maybe reluctant to do so with trainee that is a big shot. Huge loss of face. These are the moments with instructors earn their keep. Don't bend the metal trumps diplomacy for a true professional.

 Too low, too soon, too late glide slope recognition, too late noting decaying airspeed, too late adding power, too late decision to go around.

 OODA Loop was not followed by instructor pilot. Harsh, but then gravity can be harsh.

Observe

Orient

Decide

Action (take action)

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From: Dave Norvell

Date: 7/9/2013 9:47:39 AM

Subject: 777 bash @ SFO

  

Here is an email from a United crew holding short of the runway as the Asiana B-777 approached:

On July 6, 2013 at approximately 1827Z I was the 747-400 relief F/O on flt 885, ID326/06 SFO-KIX. I was a witness to the Asiana Flt 214 accident. We had taxied to hold short of runway 28L at SFO on taxiway F, and were waiting to rectify a HAZMAT cargo issue as well as our final weights before we could run our before takeoff checklist and depart. As we waited on taxiway F heading East, just prior to the perpendicular holding area, all three pilots took notice of the Asiana 777 on short final. I noticed the aircraft looked low on glidepath and had a very high deck angle compared to what seemed “normal”. I then noticed at the apparent descent rate and closure to the runway environment the aircraft looked as though it was going to impact the approach lights mounted on piers in the SF Bay. The aircraft made a fairly drastic looking pull up in the last few feet and it appeared and sounded as if they had applied maximum thrust. However the descent path they were on continued and the thrust applied didn't appear to come soon enough to prevent impact. The tail cone and empennage of the 777 impacted the bulkhead seawall and departed the airplane and the main landing gear sheared off instantly. This created a long debris field along the arrival end of 28L, mostly along the right side of 28L. We saw the fuselage, largely intact, slide down the runway and out of view of our cockpit. We heard much confusion and quick instructions from SFO Tower and a few moments later heard an aircraft go around over the runway 28 complex. We realized within a few moments that we were apparently unharmed so I got on the PA and instructed everyone to remain seated and that we were safe.

We all acknowledged if we had been located between Runways 28R and 28L on taxiway F we would have likely suffered damage to the right side aft section of our aircraft from the 777.

Approximately two minutes later I was looking out the left side cockpit windows and noticed movement on the right side of Runway 28L. Two survivors were stumbling but moving abeam the Runway “28L” marking on the North side of the runway. I saw one survivor stand up, walk a few feet, then appear to squat down. The other appeared to be a woman and was walking, then fell off to her side and remained on the ground until rescue personnel arrived. The Captain was on the radio and I told him to tell tower what I had seen, but I ended up taking the microphone instead of relaying through him. I told SFO tower that there appeared to be survivors on the right side of the runway and they needed to send assistance immediately. It seemed to take a very long time for vehicles and assistance to arrive for these victims. The survivors I saw were approximately 1000-1500' away from the fuselage and had apparently been ejected from the fuselage.

We made numerous PAs to the passengers telling them any information we had, which we acknowledged was going to change rapidly, and I left the cockpit to check on the flight attendants and the overall mood of the passengers, as I was the third pilot and not in a control seat. A couple of our flight attendants were shaken up but ALL were doing an outstanding and extremely professional job of handling the passenger's needs and providing calm comfort to them. One of the flight attendants contacted unaccompanied minors' parents to ensure them their children were safe and would be taken care of by our crew. Their demeanor and professionalism during this horrific event was noteworthy. I went to each cabin and spoke to the passengers asking if everyone was OK and if they needed any assistance, and gave them information personally, to include telling them what I saw from the cockpit. I also provided encouragement that we would be OK, we'd tell them everything we learn and to please relax and be patient and expect this is going to be a long wait. The passenger mood was concerned but generally calm. A few individuals were emotional as nearly every passenger on the left side of the aircraft saw the fuselage and debris field going over 100 knots past our aircraft only 300' away. By this point everyone had looked out the windows and could see the smoke plume from the 777. A number of passengers also noticed what I had seen with the survivors out near the end of 28L expressing concern that the rescue effort appeared slow for those individuals that had been separated from the airplane wreckage.

We ultimately had a tug come out and tow us back to the gate, doing a 3 point turn in the hold short area of 28L. We were towed to gate 101 where the passengers deplaned. Captain Jim Abel met us at the aircraft and gave us information he had and asked if we needed any assistance or hotel rooms for the evening. Captain Herlihy and F/O Ishikawa went to hotels and I went to my home an hour away in the East Bay. — at Washington Hilton.

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From: BS

Date: 7/9/2013 6:30:33 PM

To:

Subject: Low-down on Korean pilots

 

If you forward this email please delete the forwarding history, which includes my email address. It is a courtesy to me and others who may not wish to have their email addresses sent all over the world! Erasing the history helps prevent Spammers from mining addresses and viruses.

Got this from a friend, who got it from a friend, etc. Not sure how accurate it is, but it is an interesting read that's for sure.

There are a number of emails in the past two days relating to the Asiana accident at SFO, and of all of them, this is the best as it is discusses the training of Korean pilots and the Korean culture from the perspective of an American pilot who was hired to instruct Koreans.

xxxx

After I retired from UAL as a Standards Captain on the –400, I got a job as a simulator instructor working for Alteon (a Boeing subsidiary) at Asiana. When I first got there, I was shocked and surprised by the lack of basic piloting skills shown by most of the pilots. It is not a normal situation with normal progression from new hire, right seat, left seat taking a decade or two. One big difference is that ex-Military pilots are given super-seniority and progress to the left seat much faster. Compared to the US, they also upgrade fairly rapidly because of the phenomenal growth by all Asian air carriers. By the way, after about six months at Asiana, I was moved over to KAL and found them to be identical. The only difference was the color of the uniforms and airplanes. I worked in Korea for 5 long years and although I found most of the people to be very pleasant, it’s a minefield of a work environment ... for them and for us expats.

One of the first things I learned was that the pilots kept a web-site and reported on every training session. I don’t think this was officially sanctioned by the company, but after one or two simulator periods, a database was building on me (and everyone else) that told them exactly how I ran the sessions, what to expect on checks, and what to look out for. For example; I used to open an aft cargo door at 100 knots to get them to initiate an RTO and I would brief them on it during the briefing. This was on the B-737 NG and many of the captains were coming off the 777 or B744 and they were used to the Master Caution System being inhibited at 80 kts. Well, for the first few days after I started that, EVERYONE rejected the takeoff. Then, all of a sudden they all “got it” and continued the takeoff (in accordance with their manuals). The word had gotten out. I figured it was an overall PLUS for the training program.

We expat instructors were forced upon them after the amount of fatal accidents (most of the them totally avoidable) over a decade began to be noticed by the outside world. They were basically given an ultimatum by the FAA, Transport Canada, and the EU to totally rebuild and rethink their training program or face being banned from the skies all over the world. They hired Boeing and Airbus to staff the training centers. KAL has one center and Asiana has another. When I was there (2003-2008) we had about 60 expats conducting training KAL and about 40 at Asiana. Most instructors were from the USA, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand with a few stuffed in from Europe and Asia. Boeing also operated training centers in Singapore and China so they did hire some instructors from there.

This solution has only been partially successful but still faces ingrained resistance from the Koreans. I lost track of the number of highly qualified instructors I worked with who were fired because they tried to enforce “normal” standards of performance. By normal standards, I would include being able to master basic tasks like successfully shoot a visual approach with 10 kt crosswind and the weather CAVOK.  I am not kidding when I tell you that requiring them to shoot a visual approach struck fear in their hearts ... with good reason.  Like this Asiana crew, it didnt’ compute that you needed to be a 1000’ AGL at 3 miles and your sink rate should be 600-800 Ft/Min. But, after 5 years, they finally nailed me. I still had to sign my name to their training and sometimes if I just couldn’t pass someone on a check, I had no choice but to fail them. I usually busted about 3-5 crews a year and the resistance against me built. I finally failed an extremely incompetent crew and it turned out he was the a high-ranking captain who was the Chief Line Check pilot on the fleet I was teaching on. I found out on my next monthly trip home that KAL was not going to renew my Visa. The crew I failed was given another check and continued a fly while talking about how unfair Captain Brown was.

Any of you Boeing glass-cockpit guys will know what I mean when I describe these events. I gave them a VOR approach with an 15 mile arc from the IAF. By the way, KAL dictated the profiles for all sessions and we just administered them. He requested two turns in holding at the IAF to get set up for the approach.  When he finally got his nerve up, he requested “Radar Vectors” to final. He could have just said he was ready for the approach and I would have cleared him to the IAF and then “Cleared for the approach” and he could have selected “Exit Hold” and been on his way. He was already in LNAV/VNAV PATH. So, I gave him vectors to final with a 30 degree intercept. Of course, he failed to “Extend the FAF” and he couldn’t understand why it would not intercept the LNAV magenta line when he punched LNAV and VNAV. He made three approaches and missed approaches before he figured out that his active waypoint was “Hold at XYZ.”  Every time he punched LNAV, it would try to go back to the IAF ... just like it was supposed to do. Since it was a check, I was not allowed (by their own rules) to offer him any help. That was just one of about half dozen major errors I documented in his UNSAT paperwork. He also failed to put in ANY aileron on takeoff with a 30-knot direct crosswind (again, the weather was dictated by KAL).

This Asiana SFO accident makes me sick and while I am surprised there are not more, I expect that there will be many more of the same type accidents in the future unless some drastic steps are taken. They are already required to hire a certain percentage of expats to try to ingrain more flying expertise in them, but more likely, they will eventually be fired too. One of the best trainees I ever had was a Korean/American (he grew up and went to school in the USA) who flew C-141’s in the USAF. When he got out, he moved back to Korea and got hired by KAL. I met him when I gave him some training and a check on the B-737 and of course, he breezed through the training. I give him annual PCs for a few years and he was always a good pilot. Then, he got involved with trying to start a pilots union and when they tired to enforce some sort of duty rigs on international flights, he was fired after being arrested and JAILED!

The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just can’t change 3000 years of culture.

The other thing that I think plays an important role is the fact that there is virtually NO civil aircraft flying in Korea. It’s actually illegal to own a Cessna-152 and just go learn to fly. Ultra-lights and Powered Hang Gliders are Ok. I guess they don’t trust the people to not start WW III by flying 35 miles north of Inchon into North Korea.  But, they don’t get the kids who grew up flying (and thinking for themselves) and hanging around airports. They do recruit some kids from college and send then to the US or Australia and get them their tickets. Generally, I had better experience with them than with the ex-Military pilots. This was a surprise to me as I spent years as a Naval Aviator flying fighters after getting my private in light airplanes. I would get experienced F-4, F-5, F-15, and F-16 pilots who were actually terrible pilots if they had to hand fly the airplane. What a shock!

Finally, I’ll get off my box and talk about the total flight hours they claim. I do accept that there are a few talented and free-thinking pilots that I met and trained in Korea. Some are still in contact and I consider them friends. They were a joy! But, they were few and far between and certainly not the norm.

Actually, this is a worldwide problem involving automation and the auto-flight concept. Take one of these new first officers that got his ratings in the US or Australia and came to KAL or Asiana with 225 flight hours. After takeoff, in accordance with their SOP, he calls for the autopilot to be engaged at 250’ after takeoff. How much actual flight time is that? Hardly one minute. Then he might fly for hours on the autopilot and finally disengage it (MAYBE?) below 800’ after the gear was down, flaps extended and on airspeed (autothrottle). Then he might bring it in to land. Again, how much real “flight time” or real experience did he get. Minutes! Of course, on the 777 or 747, it’s the same only they get more inflated logbooks.

So, when I hear that a 10,000 hour Korean captain was vectored in for a 17-mile final and cleared for a visual approach in CAVOK weather, it raises the hair on the back of my neck.

Tom

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Subject: More on Asian Pilots

I got this from another neighbor/friend who flies to China a lot (Usually on American Airlines), doing engineering work and consulting with several different Asian companies.

1:28 PM

To: 'Roger L. Edson'

Roger, I was visiting with a consultant that had worked with Korean pilots and she said that the hierarchy is so rigid that even if the other pilot knew the problem was happening, they would not tell the pilot to correct it.

From:   Patrick Custer (patrick@custer.net) This sender is in your

Sent: Tue 7/09/13 1:28 PM

To:    'Roger L. Edson' (rle915@hotmail.com)

Roger,

 I was visiting with a consultant that had worked with Korean pilots and she said that the hierarchy is so rigid that even if the other pilot knew the problem was happening, they would not tell the pilot to correct it.

++++

From: Moser <rmoser47@gmail.com>
Date: July 9, 2013, 8:11:10 PM EDT
To:
Subject: Fwd: Korean Culture May Offer Clues in Asiana Crash

Thought you might find this interesting 

http://www.cnbc.com/id/100869966

Korean Culture May Offer Clues in Asiana Crash

 Published: Tuesday, 9 Jul 2013 | 1:20 PM ET

By: Heesun Wee | Editor, CNBC.com

Investigators combing through the debris and data recordings from the Asiana Airlines jet that crashed in San Francisco Saturday may learn more about what happened inside the cockpit of the Boeing 777 aircraft by studying an unlikely clue: Korean culture.

South Korea's aviation industry has faced skepticism about its safety and pilot habits since a few deadly crashes beginning in the 1980s. But despite changes, including improved safety records, Korea's aviation sector remains rooted in a national character that's largely about preserving hierarchy—and asking few questions.

"The Korean culture has two features—respect for seniority and age, and quite an authoritarian style," said Thomas Kochan, a professor at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "You put those two together, and you may get more one-way communication—and not a lot of it upward," Kochan said.

The Asiana pilots on Flight 214 apparently did not discuss their predicament, the Los Angeles Times reported, citing cockpit voice recordings.

As a general point of reference about the Korean language, you speak to superiors and elders in an honorific form that requires more words and can be more oblique. Less, "Yo! You want water?"; and more, "It's a warm day for a nice refreshment, no?" This may sound trivial. But put this in the context of a cockpit, where seconds and decision-making are crucial and you get an idea of how communication and culture matter.

Of course, the investigation of the flight from Seoul, South Korea, on Saturday is ongoing. It will be months before it will be known what exactly happened inside that cockpit, and what was communicated.

But as the details unravel, expect Korea's cockpit culture and training to be scrutinized further. With two Chinese teenagers dead and 180 injured out of 303 passengers, the crash offers an abrupt reflection on South Korea's tarnished aviation legacy, which officials there had hoped was behind them.

On Tuesday, Asiana Airlines Chief Executive Yoon Young-doo said the carrier has plans to improve training for its pilots. He said the pilot and co-pilot on the aircraft were qualified. The two pilots on the plane have enough qualifications, having flown to San Francisco 33 times and 29 times respectively,'' he said.

It was pilot Lee Gang-guk's first time landing a Boeing 777 at San Francisco International Airport. Lee Jung-min, the senior co-pilot in the cockpit with the younger Lee, had more experience flying 777s into San Francisco.

Investigators Interviewing Crew

Investigators have started interviewing the Asiana crew, and hope to wrap up interviews Tuesday, Deborah Hersman, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, which is investigating the crash, told CNBC Tuesday. The 46-year-old pilot behind the controls will be interviewed later Tuesday, said Hersman.

A long-standing flying adage is: aviate, navigate, communicate. "You have to have great communication among people in a team, especially in high-risk environments," said Kochan, also co-director of the MIT Sloan Institute for Work and Employment Research.

(Read More: Captain of Crashed San Francisco Plane Was 'in Training')

South Korea, meanwhile, is considering tightening regulations for pilots, seeking certification to convert to flying new aircraft after the Asiana crash, a government source said Tuesday.

Military Trend

Asiana was founded in 1988, in part to address increased travel for the Summer Olympic Games in Seoul that year. It was a key moment of pride—the country's second carrier along with its larger, older rival Korean Air.

"It was such a prestigious thing to have two national carriers," said John S. Park, an expert on the Koreas. "Then you had a number of crashes. So you didn't see the culture change all that much," said Park, a Stanton Nuclear Security junior faculty fellow at the MIT.

The crash Saturday was Asiana's third accident involving fatalities since its founding. As data recordings were collected on those crashes, a trend emerged. "What came up was the military culture in which the South Korean pilots grew up in," Park said.

Young men in South Korea must serve mandatory military service, so some air force veterans transition to civilian aviation careers. (Some American veterans, who have served after Sept. 11, are also transitioning into aviation jobs.)

But sometimes that transition into the private sector comes with military baggage.

Korea's authoritarian structure, not surprisingly, is reflected in its industries including aviation, where co-pilots traditionally have not been encouraged to challenge senior pilots. Military training only adds to constant self-awareness about where you are in an organization's pecking order—and not speaking out of turn.

"No one can really point out anything related to errors," said Park of the country's military legacy. While workplace trends are modernizing, many Korean companies still promote and reward seniority—over merit and achievements. And it's this constant reminder of a pecking order that can grip a military unit, an aviation cockpit—even a national soccer system.

In 2002, South Korea became the only Asian nation to make the World Cup tournament's semifinal round of four after a foreigner—Guus Hiddink, a Dutch coach—squashed cronyism and rewarded players on talent. "They couldn't have made a successful team under the old Korean leadership, said Choe Yong Ho, a University of Hawaii emeritus history professor, at the time.

South Korea's aviation industry has brought in new blood, too. After the crashes during the '80s, Western pilots were hired to bring in fresh blood and ideas. But a culture shift did not come for a fatal 1997 Korean Air flight.

(Read More: Entrepreneur Retrains Veterans as Helicopter Pilots)

Flight to Guam

The most recent crash involving a South Korean carrier was in 1997, when a Korean Air 747 slammed into a hill while approaching the airport in Guam, killing 225 people and later prompting a downgrade of South Korea's aviation rating by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to category 2.

The rating was restored to Category 1 in December 2001, enabling Korean carriers to open new routes, which they were not allowed to do under the lower category.

 

In a chapter titled "The Ethnic Theory of Plane Crashes," author Malcolm Gladwell in "Outliers" dissects the flight recorder transcript of the final minutes of KAL Flight 801 between the captain and first officer. As the weather worsened among other factors, Gladwell argues culture influenced the way in which they communicated. The first officer politely referred to "weather radar"—instead of using a more direct, Western-style of communication, i.e., "there's trouble ahead, captain."

In 2000, a Delta Air Lines executive was brought in to run KAL's flight operations. The Delta executive made aviation English a priority, Gladwell notes. He also brought in Alteon, a subsidiary of Boeing, to take over company training and instruction programs. A Boeing spokesman declined to comment on that KAL training given the ongoing nature of the current Asiana investigation.

As Korean pilots broadly have worked to improve operations, Korean flight attendants undergo rigorous training with constant evaluation. The Asiana crew on Flight 214 are being praised for their timely response. Clad in high-heeled pumps and pencil skirts, the women coolly carried out rescue tasks, NBC News reported. "It's remarkable that on one plane you can have two different cultures," said Park, an MIT fellow.

'Transition Training'

The larger question for investigators is how on a good weather day, an experienced Asiana crew—including a senior pilot with experience landing advanced 777s on the flight from Seoul to San Francisco—was flying too slow, and clipped the end of the runway before crashing. Early information from data recordings suggests no mechanical problems, NTSB's Hersman said.

"We really do need to understand, 'Who was the pilot in command?' 'Who was the pilot flying at the time?' 'What kind of conversations were they having?' " Hersman told CNBC Monday. "There is an expectation that anyone whose putting themselves out there to provide passenger service meets minimum safety standards," she said in an additional CNBC interview Tuesday.

The key pilot in question, Lee, had logged 43 hours flying the 777 over nine flights. It was his first landing of a 777 at SFO. It takes 60 hours and 10 flights to be considered fully qualified, the airline told NBC News. When a pilot learns a new type of aircraft, the status before full qualification is known as transition training.

Lee had a long, otherwise untarnished career, including nearly 9,700 hours clocked flying the Airbus A320 and the Boeing 737 and 747, NBC News reported. The senior co-pilot had more than 3,000 hours on the 777.

—NBC News, the Associated Press and Reuters contributed to this report.

—By CNBC's Heesun Wee; Follow her on Twitter

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From: "Roger L. Edson" <rle915@hotmail.com>
Date: July 8, 2013, 8:57:13 PM EDT
To: Scott Wall
Subject: FW: Flight Safety Information [July 7, 2013] [No. 137]

Scott:  FYI    Glide slope was out for maintenance; this could have been a big factor, especially considering the very limited  experience this captain had in the 777;  you have flown with several Asian pilots; how much of their "Culture" do you think might have entered into this - - I am referring to the fact that the Asians seem to think Captain is REALLY THE KING AND INFALLABLE, AND NOT TO BE CHALLENGED OR QUESTIONED ABOUT ANYTHING CONCERNING HIS flight procedures or performance.  Unless there was ice that had formed in the fuel system, thereby restricting the necessary amount of fuel flowing to the engines, such as happened with the 777 in England a few years ago, it would appear that they (most likely, and inadvertently) thought they were too high and set up a rate of descent or sink that was excessive and with the engines at idle rpm. Then, when they realized it they tried to add power but had to wait for the fan-jets to get up to enough rpm to develop power, and didn't have enough time or altitude to stop the rate of sink.
     Perhaps with the Asian culture of not challenging the Captain in ANY WAY, the co-pilot waited too long to alert the Captain that things were out of control.
     I have never flown the 777 but it would seem that the Flight Management System should have been announcing verbally that the airspeed was too slow AND that the rate of sink was too high, especially when below 1000' AGL (or above water level in this case).
     You may recall that in the early days of the 727 they had some crashes from setting up too high of a rate of descent, with the engines at idle, then when the speed bled off close to the ground, they couldn't recover because it takes too long for the engines to 'spool up' when they were clear back to idle rpm.
     Another item that caught my eye was that the pilots 'were, or had asked' to abort the landing and to commence a 'go-around'.  Do these Asians think they have to 'ask permission' to abort the landing', instead of just flying the aircraft and announcing later that they are 'going around'?   (As soon as their work-load permits) Since you have been through 'Asian Culture' flight training programs and have flown with some of 'these people', I thought you might have a clue on this item.   Realizing, of course, this could be 'just another inaccuracy' in the reporting by the media.
     Do you happen to know the 'Asian Airline Duty Time Limits'?  Since this flight was over 8 hours, would they have had to have a 'relief co-pilot' on duty with them, or do the Asians not go by that rule like the United States Airlines do?
     Looking forward to getting your 'slant' on these items.
     I hope it isn't as hot in Austin as it is here, but I suspect it is.    How is your 'special child' doing with her health?     RLE

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