Misc - HL303 (5)

From: David L. Roberts

Date: 3/3/2019 8:28:38 PM

To: mjs dir;  nealhe@gmail.com

Cc: David Roberts

Subject: Re: Flown west pilots lists

Hi Gents,
Please send me a copy of Neal's original request for information.  I have lists for Delta and Northwest deceased pilots and spouses.  What are you asking for?
Dave

At 08:15 PM 3/3/2019, mjs dir wrote:

 Neal,  

At the link below is the latest version of the excel sheet I have on the deceased pilots from 2011.  I am copying David Roberts because he may have a newer version of this list.  Thanks for asking and it sure would be an interesting comparison.   Make sure you compare rebs to yanks to see who lives longer.  Ha ha.  Just kidding.  Since I am a yank I have a feeling that shoveling snow has something to do with shortening our longevity.  If David has a more current list of deceased pilots than 2011 maybe he will forward it to you and I.  

Here is the link to our web page that has the lists:

http://pcn.homestead.com/FlightWest.html

Thanks for asking and staying connected,

Larry (oxpilot@gmail.com)
Member since 12/30/12

Re: PCN - HL 302 Now Published and Available! 22 Days to Spring!!! (show original) Feb 28
Is the seniority list the current one or all pilots ever on the list? I don't have a password for it

Larry

Editor: Larry and PCN, for the lists published for the PCN only on a password protected page our group password is:

                pcnpilot                     http://pcn.homestead.com/Seniority.html

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Capt Glenn Smith commenting on writing of Gene Hall

From: Glenn Smith

Date: 3/1/2019 5:30:14 PM

To: mark.pcndir@gmail.com

Subject: Gene Hall

Best article in pcn award.  More men should be bold for Christ.

Glenn Smith

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From: David L. Roberts

Date: 4/1/2019 10:40:23 AM

To: MY DELTA FRIENDS

Cc: ClayH@specialops.org;  aolson@specialops.org

Subject: Fwd: SPECIAL OPERATIONS WARRIOR FOUNDATION

Thanks to retired Delta Captain David Mattingly for sending this announcement.
Dave

From: Dave Mattingly davem@touchourplanet.org
Date: Sun, 31 Mar 2019 21:39:53 -0400
Subject: SPECIAL OPERATIONS WARRIOR FOUNDATION

After leaving my Care Fund position with Delta I wanted to get involved with a charity that helped the military and their dependents. After a lot of research, I selected The Special Operators Warrior Foundation (SOWF).  https://specialops.org/

A bit of background—SOWF came into existence in 1980 after the faileed Iranian hostage rescue attempt in which 8 Special Operators were killed leaving behind 17 children. A battlefield promise was made that the children would be taken care of—thus SOWF was born. SOWF provides immediate PRROACTIVE assistance to the families of special operators who are wounded or killed. Additionally, SOWF provides free eduction from Pre-K through College for the dependent children of the fallen warriors. That battlefield promise has lead to over 1300 children of more than 1100 warrior causalities receiving a fully funded college education. Unfortunately in 2018 there were an additional 32 Special Operations causalities which has added 68 children to the program. Special Operators comprise less than 4% of the military yet suffer 75% of the causalities.

This year SOWF has just received its 13th consecutive four star rating (the highest given) for its efficiency by Charity Navigator. This places SOWF in the top 1% of all charities rated for its fiscal management, commitment to accountability and transparency. SOWF currently has administrative overhead costs of only 5.6%

I had an opportunity to meet with the CEO/President, Major General (ret) Clay Hutmacher and his staff for a tour of their facility. I was very impressed with their professionalism and dedication to their mission. They run a lean and effective operation with little or no public advertising, which allows more money to benefit the warriors and their dependents.

Because of this model, SOWF relies mostly on word of mouth to raise their funds. If you can donate, or if you know of any person or corporation that can be contacted on behalf of SOWF, please contact Gen. Hutmacher at ClayH@specialops.org or Dave Mattingly at davem@touchourplanet.org.

If any of you have layovers in TPA, I think you would enjoy meeting Gen. Hutmacher and his staff and getting a tour of their facilities. I know you will be impressed. Their phone # is 813-805-9400 and their address is 1137 Marbella Plaza Dr.; Tampa FL 33619.

Thanks & Keep the white side up,

Dave Mattingly
770-329-6396

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Two posts concerning the B737 Max accidents

From: wmkerschner88@gmail.com
To:
Sent: 3/27/2019 6:18:01 AM Central Standard Time
Subject: Fwd: Boeing: AOPA safety expert weighs in

HERE IS ONE OPINION.

Interesting article that realistically addresses the problem and the differences in worldwide pilot competence:

Boeing's crisis: AOPA safety expert weighs in

March 21, 2019 By Richard McSpadden

Editor's note: This article was updated March 22 after further analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System reports. The review of the reports and the MAX 8's MCAS reveal that the incidents in the ASRS reports were unlikely to be caused by the MCAS. Edits were also made to correct reference to the Boeing 737 MAX 8's tail. The aircraft has a stabilizer.

“If it ain’t Boeing, I’m not going.” This proud maxim propagates within the professional pilot community, reflecting appreciation for the fundamental design principle at the core of Boeing’s airplanes: The pilot is the ultimate and final authority in aircraft control.

This guiding principle is a critical distinction between Boeing and Airbus airplanes and reflects why pilots who’ve flown both overwhelmingly favor Boeing aircraft. When the Lion Air crash of a Boeing 737 MAX 8 revealed the existence of a flight control system operating in the background, which Boeing and the FAA had not revealed when the MAX 8 was introduced, pilots felt betrayed, as if Boeing had secretly abandoned its guiding design principle and lost faith in pilot skills. In actuality, Boeing’s trust in pilot skills likely buoyed a system design and roll-out strategy that appears to be at the root of two recent MAX 8 crashes. Boeing’s critical mistake may be in assuming a worldwide standard of pilot competency that doesn’t exist.

Investigation of both crashes, which collectively took 346 lives, is in the early stages. The final outcome could reveal completely different issues for analysis. Early indications, though, indicate some type of flight control anomaly created an erratic flight condition that pilots were unable to control. Focus appears to be on the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS). MCAS is a new feature specific to MAX 8 aircraft, which activates during manual flight in certain regimes to thwart a stall by pushing the nose down. The MCAS is a stubborn system and requires pilots to completely disconnect automatic stabilizer trim to disable MCAS operation.

Boeing and the FAA agreed that the MCAS was not a significant enough modification to require additional training for pilots, which would be expensive for Boeing and its customer air carriers, and create mountains more paperwork for the FAA. Boeing and the FAA believed that any malfunction of the MCAS would reveal as a typical stabilizer trim malfunction, for which extensive documentation, procedures, and training already existed. Essentially, Boeing and the FAA thought pilots didn’t need to know there was a new function, deep in the software that activates for aircraft control, since in the event of any anomaly, pilots would recognize an automatic stabilizer trim problem and handle it with established procedures. When U.S. pilot groups were made aware of the MCAS system and briefed extensively on it after the Lion Air crash, they concurred that no additional procedure training was needed.

The stabilizer trim switches of a Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft are located on the center pedestal and can be defeated by either the pilot or the first officer, according to a career pilot familiar with the aircraft. Courtesy photo.

If the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines investigations confirm an MCAS malfunction triggered the accidents, they will also likely confirm that the pilots could have regained control of the aircraft by disabling the stabilizer trim with the console cutout switches. Utilizing the console cutout switches to handle stabilizer trim anomalies is the same procedure in place for the 737 aircraft prior to the MAX 8 variant. Recognition of stabilizer trim malfunction and reaction by using console cutout switches is the pilot response Boeing and the FAA expected. Flight path analysis in both the Lion and Ethiopian accidents indicates those pilots were likely attempting to bypass the stabilizer trim with the yoke-mounted trim disable switches and/or the control column cutout switches. The problem is, the control column cutout switches are deactivated by MCAS operation and the yoke-mounted switches only provide temporary MCAS bypass. The MCAS re-engages, with more exaggerated input, when the yoke switch is released, which would create the exaggerated and erratic pitch oscillations noted in both MAX 8 crashes.

What must be acknowledged in the ongoing MAX 8 accident investigations and follow-on analysis of Boeing and FAA conduct, is that U.S. air carriers have flown more than 50,000 flights and logged more than 100,000 hours in the Boeing MAX 8 without a mishap. If there is a problem with the MAX 8’s MCAS, it's unlikely that U.S. carriers have just been lucky not to experience it. More likely, an anomaly occurred, was handled by experienced, well-trained aircrew, and then addressed by highly qualified maintenance technicians on the ground.

It may not be a coincidence that both MAX 8 accidents occurred in less-developed regions of the world where aviation is not as advanced. The Ethiopian Airlines crew included a 29-year-old captain and a 25-year-old first officer, both light in experience compared to U.S. aircrew averages. Pilot training, cockpit culture, and aircraft maintenance procedures have been refined to an exceptional level over decades in the United States, as the safety record reflects. The aviation ecosystem in the United States requires regulators, accident investigators, pilots, airlines, and aircraft builders to cooperate for success. Governance includes objective mishap investigators who produce candid public reports often casting blame that make elements of the ecosystem squirm, and respond swiftly, when they fall short.

Boeing’s grave oversight may have been not recognizing global distinctions in aviation cultures, specifically in pilot skill and training. The subtle skill and crew coordination competencies, unrecognizable under normal operations, but conspicuous in crisis, may well prove to be the difference between a system anomaly expertly handled and catastrophic crashes resulting in 346 deaths.

Investigations are ongoing and could take a different turn, but for now, it appears the Ethiopian and Lion Air crashes may reinforce that pilot skill matters.

Richard McSpadden

Executive Director of AOPA Air Safety Institute

Richard McSpadden lead’s AOPA’s ASI, committed to reducing General Aviation mishaps by providing free educational resources and supporting initiatives that improve General Aviation safety and grow the pilot population.

Go to Richard McSpadden's Profile

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Capt Tom with a slant on the B737 Max accidents.  Editor note: Tom has a real point because I have personal friends who train foreign pilots and I have had first hand experience with some of the mediocrity.  I fear that in order to fill the demand and the right seat they are sliding lower and lower on requirements and experience in the false assumption that their “training” is sooo good that they can teach a monkey to fly. 

tom dosbozos@gmail.com         Member since 9/18/09        

                                The REST of the story!!!!

Another example of what us "pilots", who fly by the seat of our pants and don't need all the automated crap, have been saying all along.   Very unpolitically correct but true.   Boeing can't come out and say it because the Third World Country airlines are their biggest customers of all kinds of Boeing aircraft.   They can't been seen insulting that pilot group and still expect to sell them airplanes.

Like I've said for years, don't fly on Third World Airlines.   

Subject:              

Date:     Sat, 23 Mar 2019 14:16:21 -0700

From:   

 737 MAX…  The rest of the story…  For those interested in the recent spate of accidents involving Boeing's newest 737 variant, the real story of what is going on behind the scenes is largely not being reported.

It was interesting to note that President Trump alluded to the problem in a round about way, but unless you are a pilot you probably missed the point. In essence, President Trump was saying that technology is a poor substitute for a qualified pilot in command.

One of the most basic skills a pilot learns from day one is energy management of the airplane. If the plane is too slow, it will literally drop from the sky. Too fast and the wings/airframe can come apart with disastrous consequences.

In the history of commercial aviation in the US and western countries, the first crop of pilots to enter commercial service were the post world war two pilots. Those guys were the real deal and not only hand flew almost all of their hours but also in some of the most demanding conditions. The second wave were the airport kids who just fell in love with the idea of being a pilot and scrimped and saved to take lessons. Both categories of pilots were skilled in the art of aviation.

With the explosion of second and third world travel, there were not even close to the number of skilled pilots to fly the thousands of new generation planes coming out of airbus and boeing. Unline Cathay Pacific, a Hong Kong airline that was almost exclusively piloted by british pilots, the new asian airlines wanted asian pilots to man the cockpits...often with disasterous results. Asiana flight 214 crashed in SFO in 2014 because the pilots did not know how to hand fly the plane when the ground-based approach ILS was out of service.

Boeing, the FAA and worldwide aviation agencies track not only accidents, but also INCIDENTS…crap that was going sideways but didnt result in a crash. The number of unqualified pilots from asia and africa was plain to see in the number of errors being committed on a daily basis.

To make a long story short, airbus saw this eventuality decades ago and implemented automatic safety systems in anticipation of unqualified aircrews. Boeing resisted for a lot of very good reasons...but after the Asiana crash, the chinese government basically told Boeing to "idiot-proof" the 737 as china would end up being the biggest purchaser of that model. Since Boeing had opted not to add automated control systems (which often override pilot’s inputs) they were forced to apply a band-aid solution which, unfortunately was not done well. Only one sensor was driving some very complicated algos which worked against the pilot’s decision-making inputs.

The fact that the asian and african pilots were essentially unqualified is highly embarrassing to the respective governments and boeing kept it quiet. When ALPA, the pilot’s union reps found the system was added without informing the pilots, they went insane...

However, what they DON'T know, is that the MCAS system can be enabled or disabled per plane, and can be done remotely on a real time basis via uplink. The US airlines management, due to the superior training and piloting skills opted NOT to activate MCAR...but the asian/african carriers DID. That is why most of the “ crappy" airlines self grounded while all the major US airlines are still flying without a problem.

Its a very PC issue, but basically comes down to 30-40% of the global pilot population are really not qualified to be pilots, but more just data input managers.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Full post disclaimer in left column. PCN Home Page is located at: http://pcn.homestead.com/home01.html